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CANADIAN FOOD LAW UPDATE
Patricia L. Farnese'
INTRODUCTION
Provided below is an overview of developments in Canadian
food law and policy in 2009. This update primarily analyzes the
regulatory and policy developments and litigation activities by the
federal government. This focus reflects the significance of federal
activities in the food policy realm. In 2009, regulatory and policy
developments continue to be dominated by the 2008 Listeriosis out-
break in ready-to-eat, deli meats. Other noted activities include
Canada's ongoing efforts to minimize the effects of infectious dis-
eases related to meat production, Canada's request for a WTO
panel to consider the effects of American Country of Origin Label-
ling, and an initiative to clarify the application of food labelling
regulations to probiotics. The federal government, however, has
yet to reinitiate legislative action to overhaul the Food and Drugs
Act (FDA)' despite repeated signals that it would do so after the
death of Bill C-51 in 2008.'
REACTIONS AND RESPONSES TO LISTERIOSIS
Canada experienced its most acute food safety crisis in recent
time during the summer of 2008. Listeria monocytogenes was found in
ready-to-eat meat products distributed nationally. By the time the
listeriosis outbreak was contained, fifty-seven people became seri-
1. Patricia Farnese is an Assistant Professor in the College of Law at the Uni-
versity of Saskatchewan and a practicing member of Law Society of Saskatchewan.
Professor Farnese is a graduate of the LL.M. Program in Agriculture and Food Law
at the University of Arkansas.
2. This update is current to November 21, 2009.
3. R.S.C., ch. F-27 (1985) [hereinafter FDA].
4. A detailed description of proposals contained in Bill C-51 and the reason for
its death can be found in Patricia L. Farnese, Canadian Food Law Update, 4J. Food
L. & Pol'y 313, 319-22 (2008).
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ously ill of which twenty-two people were confirmed to have died as
a result of consuming contaminated food.' In the aftermath of this
crisis, the effectiveness of regulations and policies shaping the gov-
ernment's response to the outbreak as well as those designed to pre-
vent and detect food borne illness have faced significant scrutiny.
As a result, regulations and policies aimed at preventing, detecting,
and responding to food borne illnesses have dominated regulatory
and policy reform in 2009.
THE INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATOR'S REPORT
In January 2009, an independent investigation of the events
contributing to the Listeriosis outbreak was ordered by Prime Minis-
ter Harper.' The investigator was tasked with determining the cause
of the outbreak and evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of
the government's response. The investigator was also asked to make
recommendations on how to prevent a similar outbreak in the fu-
ture and to better facilitate product recall. The investigator, how-
ever, was specifically precluded from commenting on potential
criminal or civil liability stemming from the outbreak.' The investi-
gator issued her Final Report in July 2009, which contained fifty-
seven recommendations." These recommendations targeted both
the federal departments and agencies engaged in establishing, im-
plementing, and enforcing food safety policies and regulations as
well as the private meat processors.'
Of the fifty-seven recommendations, the majority addressed
four critical weakness of the Canadian Food Safety Regime. The
first weakness was described as a lack of focus on food safety by sen-
ior management in government and at Maple Leafs Food (MLF).o
This lack of focus resulted in the adoption and implementation of
food safety procedures that did not require employees to notify ei-
5. Sheila Weatherill, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATOR INTO THE 2008
LISTERIOSIs OUTBREAK, July 2009, available at http://www.listeriosis-
listeriose.investigation-enquete.g.ca/lirs-rpt e.pdf [hereinafter Final Report].
6. Press release, Office of the Prime Minister, Prime Minister Harper an-
nounces appointment of independent investigator into the listeriosis outbreak (Jan.
20, 2009) available at http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category= 1&id=2392.
7. Press release, Office of the Prime Minister, Prime Minister announces terms
of reference for an independent investigation of the listeriosis outbreak (Sept. 6,
2008) available at http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category= 1&id=2268.
8. Final Report, supra note 5.
9. See id.
10. See id at xi.
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ther senior management of MLF or the Canadian Food Inspection
Agency (CFIA) inspectors, despite positive Listeria tests." Likewise,
existing policies, procedures, and controls failed to clearly define
expected outcomes or distinguish between foods that were at high
risk of becoming contaminated and those that were at a lower risk. 2
This "one-size-fits-all approach" left much open to interpretation by
industry and specifically did not require increased scrutiny of riskier
products." Last, a lack of focus on food safety was blamed for the
CFIA's decision to under staff inspector positions at the MLF and
for not ensuring that the inspectors that were employed at MLF had
the training and capacity to be effective."
The second weakness identified in the Final Report concerned
the failure of governments and agencies to be prepared to respond
to this crisis. In particular, the level of coordination and communi-
cation between key agencies and departments within the federal
government and with their provincial counterparts was repeatedly
criticized. Many in authority were unaware of the Foodborne Ill-
ness Outbreak Response Protocol (FIORP), an intergovernmental,
inter-agency policy in place to coordinate a unified response to such
a crisis." As a result, a leadership void existed in the first few weeks
of the outbreak that delayed and undermined the effectiveness of
the emergency response." Likewise, key agencies, including labora-
tories required to identify the source of the outbreak, lacked the
necessary pre-planned, surge capacity to immediately deal with the
crisis." Finally, the report repeated calls for increased coordination
between the various laboratories throughout Canada that track and
confirm illness and disease."
The government and industry's initial failures to treat this out-
break as an urgent concern was the third weakness identified in the
Final Report. The outbreak was not originally viewed as a public
health emergency primarily because this crisis involved a food borne
illness rather than an infectious disease." As a result, there was a
delay by the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) in assuming a
11. See id.
12. Id. at xii.
13. See Final Report, supra note 5 at xii.
14. See id. at xi.
15. Id. at xii.
16. Id. at 63.
17. Id.
18. Final Report, supra note 5, at 72-73.
19. Id. at 73.
20. Id. at 67.
2009] 275
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
leadership role.2 ' The PHAC's reluctance to view listeriosis con-
tamination as a public health emergency occurred within the con-
text of a larger debate between the public health and food safety
sectors concerning the appropriate approach to responding to food
borne illness. In particular, the debate is focused on the timing of
product recall.' Characterizing food borne illness as a public health
emergency supports the adoption of a precautionary approach to
product recall. Many argue, however, that the significant and lasting
economic consequences of product recalls warrants laboratory con-
firmation of the source of contamination. Laboratory confirmation
would ensure that only the source of the contamination is identified
as causing illness thereby preventing the mistaken recall of 'inno-
cent' products."
Finally, the Final Report identified weaknesses in the timing,
method, and content of the government's communication with the
public. There were specific concerns about the Minister of Agricul-
ture and Agri-food acting as the lead spokesperson during the out-
break rather than the Minister of Health." The Minister of Agricul-
ture and Agri-food was perceived to be in a conflict of interest as he
is tasked with supporting the food industry.25 Therefore, the health
information provided to the public was viewed as suspect. In addi-
tion, the Final Report criticized the fact that early communications
with the public did not explain that certain populations were more
vulnerable to becoming sick." The Final Report also called for an
advance communication strategy that has material ready for use
prior to an outbreak that will accurately inform the public on how
best to minimize risks associated with that specific, food borne ill-
ness.2 ' Likewise, the Final Report recommended consideration of
the use of precautionary labeling, in the advance of an outbreak, on
food products that pose particular risks for vulnerable populations.
THE REGULATORY AND POLICY RESPONSE
Upon release of the independent investigator's Final Report,
the Canadian government committed to take action on all of the
21. Id.
22. Id. at xiii.
23. Final Report, supra note 5, at xiii.
24. Id. at xiv.
25. Id.
26. Id. at xiii.
27. Id. at xiv.
28. Final Report, supra note 5, at xiii.
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recommendations.' However, prior to the release of the report,
the CFIA, Health Canada (HG), and the PHAC conducted internal
investigations and had begun considering and implementing
changes to policies and regulations." Although the consequences
of the listeriosis outbreak may suggest to some that significant flaws
exist in Canada's food safety regime, a comprehensive overhaul of
this regulatory regime has not been recommended. Instead, the
resulting regulatory and policy changes have been primarily charac-
terized by minor adjustments aimed at clarifying governmental roles
and responsibilities and improving the system for monitoring of
disease incidents. By streamlining response procedures, these
changes have been designed to increase the efficiency of the gov-
ernment's response to a crisis." The burden for preventing, moni-
toring, and reporting food contamination remains with the meat
processing industry.
The most concrete outcomes from the various reviews and in-
vestigations into government and industry responses to the Listerio-
sis outbreak have targeted the section concerning Listeria contained
in the Meat Hygiene Manual of Procedures (MOP). The MOP outlines
the mandatory food handling, testing, and safety reporting practices
that must be followed at registered meat processing facilities in
Canada." Changes to the MOP following the Listeriosis crisis in-
clude mandatory testing of surface areas that come in contact with
food, the performance of trend analysis on regular test results, and
the immediate reporting, to senior industry management and the
CFIA, of all food contact surface listeria tests that test positive for
Listeria."
The majority of the government action in response to the re-
port has targeted internal processes. Various government depart-
ments and agencies have reported hiring more staff and facilitating
more training of existing staff to improve food borne illness detec-
tion and response capacity." Likewise, inter-agency discussions have
29. Press Release, Can. Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), Government of Canada
Takes Action to Improve Food Safety (Sep. 11, 2009) available at
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/corpaffr/newcom/2009/2009091 1e.shtml.
30. CFIA, MOVING FORWARD ON FOOD SAFETY ACTION ON LISTERIA, available at
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/ english/fssa/movava/movavae.shtml.
31. See Murdoch and Bellemare, supra note 29.




34. Final Report, supra note 5, at Appendix C.
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occurred to clarify responsibilities of the CFIA, HC, and the PHAC
in the event of a similar crisis in the future." Commitments for im-
proved cooperation have also been made between federal agencies
and their provincial and territorial counterparts." In the absence of
a significant food borne illness outbreak, however, it is difficult to
assess the impact of these initiatives.
ON-FARM BIOSECURITY
In addition to initiatives directed at minimizing incidents of
food borne illness, the Canadian government has continued to focus
on improving on-farm biosecurity practices to limit infectious dis-
eases related to meat production. Prior to the detection of an infec-
tious disease of concern, the government had mandated few biose-
curity practices. For the most part, Canada's approach to on-farm
biosecurity continues to utilize voluntary programs. This approach
reflects the government's confidence that infectious diseases can be
controlled through biosecurity practices by ensuring "what is inside
stays in and what is outside stays out."" In 2009, the government
continued to fund and endorse voluntary, industry-led standards.
The National Avian On-Farm Biosecurity Standard is the latest
voluntary biosecurity standard targeting livestock and poultry pro-
ducers that has been endorsed by the Canadian government." The
standard was developed in consultation with producers, processors,
the poultry science industries, veterinarians and academia." In prac-
tice, producers are participating in a variety of programs created by
provincial industry associations, the national On-Farm Food Safety
Program, and by processors. The Avian Standard attempts to iden-
tify and address any of the shortcomings of other programs without
imposing one universal standard."o
Recommended practices are said to reflect an "objective, impar-
tial science-based approach" and a cost/benefit analysis." Restrict-
35. Id.
36. Id.




39. Press Release, CFIA, Protect Poultry, Prevent Disease: National Standard is
Launched (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/corpaffr/
newcom/2009/20091006e.shtml (last visited January 14, 2010).
40. AVIAN STANDARD, supra note 37, at i.
41. Id.at ii.
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ing access by humans, animals, and equipment in and out of pro-
duction is a key component of the Avian Standard. Similarly, the
Avian Standard recommends disinfection as people, equipment, and
animals move between production areas as well as daily sweeps of
flocks to monitor health status of the animals."
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELING
The Canadian government has long been concerned with the
imposition of mandatory country of origin labeling (COOL) in the
United States." As Canada's largest agricultural trading partner, any
perceived barrier to market access in the United States is alarming."
Consequently, Canada has requested that the WTO establish a panel
to consider its complaint that the American COOL requirements
unfairly discriminate against Canadian hog and cattle producers."
The panel was requested after two official WTO consultations with
the United States failed to alleviate Canada's concerns. Canada is
joined by Mexico in alleging that American COOL regulations vio-
late WTO trading rules." On November 19, 2009, the WTO's Dis-
pute Settlement Body established a panel to consider these com-
plaints pursuant to Article 9.1 of the WATO's Dispute Settlement
Understanding."
The American COOL regulations require retailers to inform
consumers of the origin of products listed as "covered commodi-
42. See id. at Section 1.
43. See id. at Sections 2 and 3.
44. Seee.g., LORIE SRIVASTAVA, LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT, PARLIAMENTARY
RESEARCH BRANCH, COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELING, PRB 03-02E ( 2003).
45. AGRICANDAGRI-FOODCAN, AGRI-FOOD TRADE POLICY: CANADA-UNITED STATES
AGRICULTURAL TRADE (2003) available at http://www.agr.gc.ca/itpd-
dpci/amr/4858-eng.htm.
46. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Canada on United States - Cer-
tain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/8 (Oct. 9,
2009), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu-e/ /cases-e/
ds384_e.htm. [hereinafter Canada Complaint].
47. Press Release, Dep't of Foreign Aff. and Int'l Trade of Can.Canada Requests
WTO Panel on U.S. Mandatory Country-of-Origin Labelling (Oct. 7, 2009) available
at http://www.international.gc.ca/media-commerce/comm/news-communiques/
2009/296.aspx?lang=eng [hereinafter DFAIT].
48. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Mexico on United States - Cer-
tain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WT/DS386/7 (Oct. 13,
2009), available at http-//www.worldtradelaw.net/pr/ds386-7(pr).pdf.
49. Press release, WTO, DSB authorizes Brazil countermeasures in "cotton"
case, establishes "COOL" and poultry panels (Nov. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news09_e/dsb_19nov09_e.htm.
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ties."" The inclusion of pork and beef as covered commodities is of
particular concern to Canada." Canada alleges that these regula-
tions violate Article 2.1 of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barri-
ers to Trade dealing with favourable treatment, Article 2.2 requiring
trade restrictions to have a legitimate objective, and Article 2.4 re-
quiring regulations be based on relevant international standards."
Moreover, if the United States claims that the COOL regulations are
sanitary or phytosanitary measures, Canada asserts that the regula-
tions do not conform to requirements outlined in the WTO Agree-
ment on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures."
Furthermore, Canada alleges that the American COOL provi-
sions result in Canadian beef and pork being treated less favourably
in the marketplace than American beef and pork.' Both the 1994
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the WTO Agreement
on Rules of Origin require the uniform, impartial and reasonable
application of trade restrictions among member countries." Thus,
any measure that purports to assign a benefit to local products over
foreign products is suspect. By requesting a Dispute Settlement
Panel, Canada seeks relief for Canadian producers from these al-
leged trade barriers."
PROBIOTICS GUIDANCE
In April 2009, HC released a guidance document to clarify the
acceptable use of health claims related to probiotic microorganisms
(probiotics) on food labels." For many, the Probiotics Guidance is
long overdue as many foods in the marketplace have been labeled as
containing probiotics for some time now.' These labels have been
50. Final Rule on Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef Pork, Lamb, Chicken,
Goat Meat, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and Macada-
mia Nuts, published on 15 January 2009 as 7 CFR Part 65.
51. DFAIT, supra note 47.
52. Canada Complaint, supra note 46.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Art. X:3(a) (1994); The Agree-
ment on the Rules of Origin, Art. 2(e)(1994).
56. Canada Complaint, supra note 46.
57. FOOD DIRECTORATE, Heath Canada, GUIDANCE DOCUMENT - THE USE OF
PROBIOTIC MICROORGANISMS IN FOOD at 2, (April, 2009) available at http://www.hc-
sc.gc.ca/fn-an/legislation/guide-ld/probiotics-guidance-orientation_ probiotiques-
eng.php. [hereinafter PROBIOTics GUIDANCE].
58. Gary Gnirss, Regulatory Affairs: Understanding Probiotics, FOOD IN CANADA,
October 2009.
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accompanied with specific claims of the health benefits associated
with the probiotic contained within the food. The Probiotics Guid-
ance will be used by the CFIA to assess whether any product that is
labeled as containing probiotics complies with provisions of the Food
and Drugs Act that prohibit labelling food "in a manner that is false,
misleading or deceptive or is likely to create an erroneous impres-
sion regarding its character, value, quantity, composition, merit or
safety.""
Interestingly, the guidance does not define which microorgan-
isms qualify as probiotics. Rather, the guidance refers to Expert
Consultation for the meaning of probiotics undertaken by the Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO).' In food, the FAO/WHO consultation defined a
probiotics as "live microorganisms which when consumed in ade-
quate amounts as part of food confer a health benefit to the host.""
Therefore, to label a food as containing a probiotic, the probiotic
microorganism must be present in sufficient quantity to confer a
health benefit.
LITIGATION
In addition to regulatory and policy activity, the federal gov-
ernment was involved in three court cases that warrant mentioning.
The first involves the legality of regulations prescribing composi-
tional standards for certain cheeses. The second case challenged the
federal government's rejection of an application to test market baby
food in non-standardized containers. Finally, a poultry processor
received a significant fine for violating animal transport regulations.
SAPUTO INC. v. CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL)
New compositional standards for cheese took effect in Decem-
ber 2008. Unlike many food products, cheese is subjected to two
sets of regulations. Compositional standards for cheese are found
in both the Dairy Products Regulations of the Canada Agricultural
59. R.S. 1985, c F-27, §5(1) [hereinafter FDA].
60. PROBIoTIcs GUIDANCE, supra note 57, at 3.
6 1. Id.
62. MATHIEU FRIGON, "COMPOSITIONAL STANDARDS FOR CHEESE" OTAWA,
LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT 26 December 2007at 1.
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Products Acte and the Food and Drug Regulations of the FDA." Before
the amendments were made, there appeared to be an inconsistency
between the two standards as only the DPR permitted cheese to be
made from "other milk solids." Domestic dairy processors argued
that the inclusion of "other milk solids" in the DPR permitted
cheese to be made from a broader range of milk solids than those
specifically listed in the FDR." In the alternative, Canadian dairy
farmers argued for restricting the meaning of "other milk solids" to
those milk products listed in the FDR because a broader definition
permitted the import of less expansive milk products that could be
used in place of fresh milk for cheese production.' With the corre-
sponding loss in the domestic cheese production market, dairy
farmers must sell their fresh milk at a lower cost to alternative mar-
kets such as the animal feed market."
The three largest dairy processors in Canada, Kraft Canada
Inc., Parmalat Canada Inc., and Saputo Inc., initiated an action in
Federal Court for judicial review of the new regulations.' The
processors challenged the constitutionality of the new regulations
and alleged that the regulations were invalid as they were beyond
the scope of the regulation-making authority granted under the
CAPA and the FDA.
The federal government relied on s.91(2) of the Constitution Act,
1867,' known as the federal trade and commerce power, to assert
that the cheese compositional standards were validly enacted. Be-
cause marketing legislation directed at extra-provincial trade has
been found to be a valid exercise of the authority granted to the
government in s.91(2)," Martineau J. considered whether the cheese
compositional standards targeted either inter-provincial or foreign
trade of cheese. After reviewing the content of the regulations, the
court concluded that the legislative intent and purpose of the regu-
lations were to establish compositional standards for cheese des-
63. Dairy Products Regulations, SOR/79-804 at §2 [hereinafter DPR]; Canada
Agricultural Products Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.20 (4' Supp.) [hereinafter CAPA].
64. Food and Drugs Act,C.R.C., c.870 at §B.08.001.1 [hereinafter FDR].
65. Frigon, supra note 62 at 2.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Saputo Inc. and Others v. The Attorney General of Canada [20091 FCJ No.
1016(Can.) [hereinafter Saputo].
69. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C., No.5
(Appendix 111985).
70. Labatt Brewing Co. v. Canada, [1980] 1 SCR 914, 915 (Can.).
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tined for interprovincial, import, and export trade." As a result, the
provisions were found to be a valid exercise of the federal govern-
ment's constitutional authority.
Likewise, Martineau J. rejected the processor's claims that the
regulations exceeded the regulation-making authority granted by the
FDA and the CAPA. Instead, Martineau J. described the enabling
statutes as providing the Governor in Council with broad authority
and concluded that the "new Regulations fit squarely within the ob-
jectives and powers outlined in the provisions." Moreover, Marti-
neau J. expressly rejected the processors' claim that the purpose of
the regulations was to transfer economic benefit from the proces-
sors to the dairy producers after finding the processors' evidence
unpersuasive." The application was, therefore, dismissed in its en-
tirety."
Saputo Inc. and Kraft Canada Inc. have recently filed an appli-
cation to appeal the trial decision with the Federal Court of Ap-
peal." Parmalat Canada Inc., however, is not listed as an appellant
on the appeal."
SELECT BRAND DISTRIBUTORS INC. V. CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL)
The plaintiffs brought an application to the Federal Court for
judicial review of the CFIA's refusals to allow non-standardized size
jars of Gerber brand baby food to be test marketed in Canada."
Although the Processed Products Regulations of the CAPA only permit
baby food to be sold in two sizes, " §9.1 creates a process wherein
one can apply for approval to sell a product in a non-standardized
size for the purpose of testing the market. The applicants' requests
were refused on the grounds that applicants had failed to establish
that non-standardized sizes would not disrupt normal trading pat-
terns as required by §9.1(5)(a)."
71. Saputo,[2009] F.C. at 122.
72. Id. at 130.
73. See id. at 142.
74. Id. at 189.




77. Select Brand Distributors Inc. v. Canada, [2009] F.C.547(Can.).
78. Processed Product Regulations, SOR/82-701(Can,) at Schedule III, Table III,
Container, Section (2) [hereinafter PPR].
79. Select Brand Distributors, supra note 77 at 18.
2009] 283
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
Similar to the discussion in Saputo, the court considered
whether the regulations exceeded the scope of regulation-making
authority outlined in the CAPA." Hughes found the legislative in-
tent of CAPA was "the provision of food to the Canadian market-
place for its consumption."" As such, Hughes took issue with the
attempt to direct patterns of the marketplace contained in
§9.1(5)(a). The court found that regulating the marketplace fell
within activities prescribed pursuant to the Competition Act,' thus its
inclusion in the PPR was ultra vires." §9.1(5)(a) was struck down and
the CFIA was ordered to allow the applicants to test market baby
food for up to 24 months.'
Perhaps more interesting than the ultimate outcome of this de-
cision, however, is Hughes evidentiary conclusions regarding the
CFIA's handling of the applicants' requests and the nature of the
market for baby food in Canada. In obiter, Hughes indicated that
even if §9.1(5)(a) had not been found ultra vires, the CFIA's refusals
to allow the applicants to test market baby food would have been set
aside for being unreasonable.' The court concluded that the CFIA
had no evidence before it from which to draw any conclusions about
the impact of the test market on normal or usual trading patterns.'
As such, CFIA's decisions to refuse the applicants' requests were
described as "..flawed, lacking transparency and, unreasonable."" In
addition, Hughes J. expressed distress about the monopolistic na-
ture of the baby food market in Canada and suggested that the
Competition Bureau should be concerned.'
R V. PRAIRIE PRIDE NATURAL FOODS LTD. AND MR. BRUCE ARABSKY
In July, Prairie Pride, a poultry processor, and Mr. Arabsky pled
guilty and were fined $440,000 for contravening provisions of the
Health of Animals Regulations" mandating the conditions for the hu-
80. Id. at 120.
81. Id. at 128.
82. Competition Act, R.S.C., c. C-34 (1985).
83. Select Brand Distributors, supra note 77 at 30.
84. See id. at 135.
85. Id. at 132.
86. Id.. at 18.
87. Id. at 33.
88. Select Brand Distributors, supra note 77, at 118.
89. C.R.C., c. 296(2009) [hereinafter HAR].
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mane transport of animals." According to the Prosecution Bulletin
released by the CFIA after sentencing, the accused, after being
warned, continued to violate HAR regulations limiting the amount
of time an animal can be in transport and the conditions of that
transport.9' §140(2) prohibits the transportation of animals in
crowded conditions that are likely to cause the animals injury or
undue suffering. Likewise, §148(1) provides that poultry cannot be
in transport for over 36 hours. On a number of occasions, despite
the warning, the defendants shipped large quantities of live birds
from Saskatchewan to British Columbia.' Many of the birds were
dead when they arrived at the processors in British Columbia.'
Because the defendants pled guilty, there is no published deci-
sion from the Provincial Court outlining the finding of facts. Thus,
little information about the circumstances leading to the conviction
is known. The penalty, however, is of a magnitude rarely seen in
Canada resulting from CFIA prosecutions. Unfortunately, it is diffi-
cult to assess the significance of this case as CFIA prosecutors rarely
face not guilty pleas. As a result, there is no body of reported court
decisions from which to analyze comprehensively trends or patterns
in CFIA prosecutions.
90. CFIA, Prosecution Bulletin, Prairie Pride Natural Foods Ltd. and Bruce
Arabsky Fined $440,000 For Humane Transport Violations (Sept. 14, 2009) avail-
able at http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/corpaffr/projud/2009/20090914e.
shtml.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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